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ABSTRACT 
LIFE AND AGENCY: CONSTITUTIVISM AND THE SOURCE OF 
PRESCRIPTIVE NORMS 
by 
Tristan de Liège 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2015 
Under the Supervision of Professor Luca Ferrero 
I explore a recent project in metaethics known as “constitutivism,” and presents an out-
line of a new approach to that view. Constitutivism is an approach to moral realism that 
attempts to ground objective moral norms in the nature of action. This is done by show-
ing that action has a constitutive aim, and that agents are committed to action, and so are 
thereby committed to that aim. Since agents can fulfill that aim with varying degrees of 
success, this aim generates a standard of evaluation. If this project succeeds, it would 
serve to make moral norms real and objective and simultaneously avoid the serious epis-
temological or metaphysical obstacles that traditional realism faces. This view has come 
under criticism from philosophers who argue that the norms deriving from the nature of 
action will be insufficient to deal with moral skepticism and will be arbitrary from a nor-
mative point of view. I outline a form of neo-Aristotelian constitutivism that I think does 
not face these problems.We can conceive of action in both a minimal and substantive 
way, and that a substantive conception of action generates objective norms when coupled 
with important considerations about the biological nature of human beings. Finally, I dis-
cuss the crucial role of choice in my view of morality and the objectivity of norms.  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         Introduction 
Constitutivism is a relatively recent project in the philosophy of action that has arisen 
from the idea that objective norms derive from the nature of agency. Since our agency 
(our capacity to engage in intentional action) is such an important feature of human exis-
tence, constituvists believe that investigating it can answer important questions about 
ethics and the nature of rationality. These philosophers aspire to show moreover that we 
can have an objective basis for our normative claims without facing the traditional 
metaethical obstacles to moral realism.  This objective basis would be rooted in the fact 1
that agency offers a standard of evaluation regulated by mind-independent facts of reality, 
but facts that are neither mysterious nor unaccountable.   2
 Constitutivists face some difficult challenges if they are to vindicate their posi-
tion. David Enoch has identified at least one important challenge to the view that the ob-
jectivity of the norms of agency can be foundational.  Since the goal of constitutivism is 3
to ground moral norms in agency, we can reformulate this challenge to make it clearer for 
my purposes here. On the one hand, Enoch’s challenge raises the question, “Why should  
 Moral realism here being the view that some moral claims are true and pertain to objective facts. Another 1
closely related benefit of the constitutivist project, if it can be made to succeed, is that it finds a nice middle 
ground between the internalist and externalist positions on reasons. See Williams, “Internal and External 
Reasons.” This is important because both internalists and externalists seem to face counterintuitive implica-
tions to their views. 
 This is broadly similar to the view of objectivity present in the natural sciences. I do not wish to enter the 2
debate here on whether objectivity in moral philosophy is domain-specific or not, i.e., whether it is different 
in kind from objectivity in the natural sciences. See Leiter (2001). Instead I focus here on what I take to be 
the relevant issue, which is that the norms deriving from agency are relevant to moral discourse and not 
rooted in feelings or attitudes of individuals.
  This appears first in Enoch (2006), and appears again in Enoch (2011). (I will here mostly focus on 3
Enoch’s arguments in the latter paper, since these are his updated views.)
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one care about being a good agent?” and on the other, “Can objective norms be grounded 
in agency?” What I take Enoch to be arguing is that neither of these questions can be sat-
isfactorily answered by the constitutivist. I hope to show that at least one version of con-
stitutivism can withstand Enoch’s challenge and defend objective and prescriptive (i.e., 
action-guiding) moral norms. 
 First, I will examine the basic elements of constitutivism and Enoch’s challenge 
more closely. Next, I shall outline a constitutivist view inspired by Philippa Foot’s dis-
cussion of the natural basis of norms in Natural Goodness. Ultimately, I argue that 
Enoch’s criticism does not succeed against a constitutivist view that holds prescriptive 
moral norms as being conditional upon the basic choice to pursue life. If one makes this 
choice, one ought to be moral and abide by the norms of agency, since living well re-
quires being a good agent. I will argue that the norms of morality are objective because 
they are ultimately rooted in objective facts about human beings and the way they live. 
I. What is Constitutivism? 
 Let us clarify what constitutivism is and what it hopes to achieve. I characterize 
constitutivism primarily by its methodology, rather than the specific content of the norms 
it seeks to establish. These views suggest that human action has one or more constitutive 
aims that allow us to evaluate specific actions or agents as being good or bad members of 
their kind. But what does it mean for action to have a constitutive aim? David Velleman 
(2009), a proponent of a constitutivist view, explains this as “an aim with respect to 
which behavior must somehow be regulated in order to qualify as an action.” In other 
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words, what makes something an action is the fact that it aims at a certain end. Constitu-
tivists disagree on what the specific aim or function of action is, and so their normative 
conclusions vary widely.   4
 Constitutivist accounts begin with two basic maneuvers. First, a claim is made 
about some goal, aim, or function being constitutive of action. To count as an action, be-
havior must be regulated by the right aim. For example, Velleman suggests that action 
must aim at a kind of self-knowledge.  On Velleman’s view, actions are just those in5 -
stances of behavior that are constituted to promote self-knowledge. Behavior that does 
not promote self-knowledge in any way, such as unintentional reflexes or “Freudian 
slips” will therefore not count as actions according to Velleman. Second, a set of norms 
evaluating human action are derived from that constitutive aim, and individual actions 
can fail to fully promote that aim. Constitutivist views aim at showing how interesting 
prescriptive norms (ideally, ethical norms) can rest upon the standards evaluating action 
as such, and that agency is therefore the source of all normative reasons for action. If pre-
scriptive norms (i.e. norms guiding our choices) of agency can be derived in this way, 
they would exhibit a feature that other norms do not; they would (at least, on some con-
 See Velleman, Korsgaard, and Katsafanas. Velleman and Korsgaard each defend a version of constitu4 -
tivism that is influenced by Kantian moral theory, while Katsafanas defends a Nietzschean constitutivism. 
Katsafanas has a view which superficially may seem similar to mine, in which he argues that action has two 
constitutive aims. It is worth noting that my approach is the not the same as his.
 Consider the following examples: for Katsafanas (2013), the aim of action is power, for Korsgaard 5
(2009), the aim of action is self-constitution, for Velleman (1996) the aim of action is self-understanding or 
coherence.
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stitutivist approaches) be inclusive of all other prescriptive norms.  On this view, the jus6 -
tification of any specific prescriptive (i.e. action-guiding) norm (such as “one ought to be 
honest”) rests upon its relation to the aim of action.  
 A constitutivist-style evaluation about many activities is pre-theoretically appeal-
ing. For instance, farming, medicine, or construction have certain constitutive aims 
(growing food, promoting health, and designing stable human buildings), and these de-
termine the standards by which specific instances of those activities are evaluated. These 
norms have an additional feature in being prescriptive: they provide guiding principles 
that individuals must choose to conform to if they are to perform that activity well. The 
question concerning constitutivists is whether evaluative and prescriptive moral norms 
can be applied to all intentional human action (agency) as such, and whether these norms 
can serve the foundation of other norms, especially ethical norms. 
 As a meta-ethical project, I must stress that constitutivism is not necessarily 
committed to any particular approach to normative ethics, and although my discussion in 
this essay may suggest a specific view, different normative ethical systems could be justi-
fied by a constitutivist foundation. I take it that this is yet a further strength of the consti-
tutivist project. 
 Of course, this assumes that there are no prescriptive norms for which there are no normative reasons to 6
act. However, I will not consider here the possibility of such non-reason-giving norms, and take this claim 
to be sufficiently plausible for my argument here.
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     II. The Shmagency Challenge 
 David Enoch (2011) argues that constitutivism as a general approach cannot work. 
The main problem, as he sees it, is that: 
…the status of being constitutive of agency does not suffice for a normatively non-arbitrary status. 
Of course, if there were some independent reason to be an agent (for instance, rather than a shma-
gent), or to perform actions, this objection would go away. But the price would be too high, for 
such an independent reason — one not accounted for by the constitutivist story, but rather presup-
posed by it — would make it impossible for constitutivism to be the whole, or the most founda-
tional, account of normativity, or to deliver on its promised payoffs. 
On his view, even if it can be shown that action has a constitutive aim and agency is 
something all humans must engage in, these norms cannot be objective unless there is a 
more fundamental normative reason to care about agency in the first place. This is be-
cause constitutivism itself cannot offer a normative reason for why one ought to be an 
agent rather than something similar to an agent that does not meet the aim of action, e.g., 
a “shmagent.” Enoch agrees that we plausibly have reasons to care about being good 
agents. However, he thinks that these are reasons that do not derive from any constitutive 
aim that we have, but rather derive from a scheme of irreducibly normative reasons. 
 By the nature of the constitutivist project, constitutivists are committed to pre-
scriptive norms deriving from agency, so these philosophers cannot appeal to some inde-
pendent (non-agential) normative reason to ground agency; in other words, the constitu-
tivist cannot merely suggest that “you ought to be an agent because that is what is pre-
scribed by the more fundamental set of norms X.” For as Enoch points out, that would 
mean that X is a more fundamental source of normativity than action itself. In that case, 
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the view is contrary to the explicit goals of the constitutivist project. On the other hand, if 
there is no reason to be an agent, then the normative standards deriving from agency 
would be arbitrary, and constitutivism is false. They would be arbitrary in just the same 
way that telling someone to care about the constitutive aim of chess, even when that per-
son has no reason to care about chess, would be arbitrary. As I take it, we can reformulate 
Enoch’s challenge into two questions:  
 a) Why should one care about being a good agent?  
 b) Can we ground objective normativity in agency (a non-normative feature of the 
  world)? 
 As Enoch (2011) observes, the fact that we might be currently engaged in action 
is not a sufficient reason for us to care about agency. Agency is in this respect no different 
for us than any other (specific) activity, such as playing chess. Chess has its own internal 
standards; if you are not attempting to checkmate the opponent’s king, or if you are not 
moving your pieces in accordance with the rules to further that aim, you are not really 
playing chess. But no one believes that the fact that we are playing chess (or something 
like chess) at any given moment suffices for our having reasons to checkmate our oppo-
nent, for we might have no reason to play chess in the first place. This situation does not 
change even if playing chess is somehow inescapable, for instance if there is a gunman 
coercing one into playing chess.  Supposing that there were some individual who did not 7
 Of course, you would then have a reason to play chess if you had some independent reason not to get 7
shot, but that is not the point. The point is that the mere inescapability does not suffice for caring about the 
constitutive aim of chess.
 
!7
care about the constitutive aim of agency, a “shmagent,” what could the constitutivist say 
to her? 
 Luca Ferrero (2009) has responded that constitutivists have no refutation of 
Enoch’s “shmagent,” but are able to defuse the challenge. This is because of two features 
that make agency special. First, it is the enterprise with the “largest jurisdiction.” This is 
because all our projects and enterprises are expressions of agency more broadly. Second-
ly, agency is “closed under the operation of reflective rational assessment.” This means 
that we cannot ask questions about what we have reason to do, or what it is rational to do, 
apart from or external to agency; in short, only agents can engage in practical reasoning. 
We could only suppose otherwise if we make an implausible analogy between agency and 
ordinary activities, such as playing chess. Playing chess has constitutive standards and 
aims (including having the aim of checkmating the opponent’s king), but it is possible, 
even while playing chess, to ask whether one has a reason to checkmate the king; one can 
sensibly ask whether one has a reason to play chess to begin with external to the game 
itself. Since the shmagent is asking an impossible question, the shmagency objection is 
defused. 
 Enoch finds this response to be unhelpful for the constitutivist, without support 
from further arguments or different lines of reasoning. The “external challenge” to 
agency seems on the face of it coherent: it seems perfectly coherent to ask why one 
should care about the constitutive aim of action (whatever it turns out to be). Therefore, 
we might be suspicious that the constitutivist should have more to say. From a dialectical 
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point of view, the self-defeating nature of the skeptic is irrelevant, since this is perfectly 
consistent with the possibility that constitutivism is false. I shall grant Enoch these points 
here. I am sympathetic with Ferrero’s response, but unless we show more substantively 
how agency is connected to what we rationally care about and value, the challenge has 
not been met. 
 Velleman’s (2004) response to Enoch’s skepticism is similar to Ferrero’s, but 
stresses a different issue. On his view, since action aims at self-knowledge, the “shma-
gent” is incoherent because the very fact of asking whether one has reasons entails “try-
ing to bring his behavior under descriptions that would embody knowledge of what he 
was doing.” What this amounts to is the claim that one does not even count as an agent 
without having certain basic motivations. As Enoch rightly stresses, this puts Velleman in 
a difficult position. On the one hand, Velleman can “pack in” very little into what is con-
stitutive of agency, and hence maintain a plausible view of the constitutive aim of action. 
If he does this, however, he cannot then easily derive interesting norms of practical rea-
son and morality. On the other hand, if Velleman packs more in, for example by claiming 
that a certain commitment is itself constitutive of agency, his account becomes less plau-
sible. Kieran Setiya makes this latter point especially clear when he remarks that “if act-
ing in accordance with one’s intention is sufficient to satisfy the constitutive aim of ac-
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tion, and thereby sufficient for doing what there is most reason to do, the standards of 
practical reason are too easy to meet.”  8
 My view takes a radical departure in responding to Enoch’s challenge. In this es-
say, I will concede Setiya’s (and Enoch’s) point that a minimal conception of agency can-
not generate prescriptive norms of morality. However, a minimal conception of action 
need not be our only interpretation of action; on my view, we can answer both questions 
that Enoch raises with a dual conception of agency. We can ground prescriptive norms in 
light of the facts that action aims at life, together with the basic goal of individuals to pur-
sue life. We can then show that the question “why be moral?” is answerable only by those 
individuals, but that morality is still objective. This bypasses Enoch’s challenge to the 
plausibility of constitutivist standards, since I will argue that pursuing life gives rise to a 
complex set of normative prescriptions. 
 In this essay, then, I adopt a dual conception of agency involving both a minimal 
and a substantive interpretation. On the minimal interpretation, we may formally call an 
action that which constitutively aims at realizing our intentions, and hence an agent one 
who merely pursues any goals or intentions in her activities. Given the more specific con-
text of agents acting to preserve their existence, we can identify the proper aim of action 
as life. This is the substantive interpretation. In other words, proper actions, actions prop-
er to agents given their nature, constitutively aim at life. Both of these two interpretations 
 Setiya (2003). Setiya admits that Velleman’s response is to point out that there are degrees of self-knowl8 -
edge, and that we can thereby explain away implausible candidates for justified (but intentional) actions. 
Setiya then argues, (convincingly, in my opinion) however, that this still fails because Velleman does not 
provide the right account of how self-knowledge is the aim of action.
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are essential for determining what counts as action in the broad sense and identifying the 
proper aim of action in the narrow sense. Note that what counts as a proper action on my 
view cannot be answered without reference to some account of what it is to be a morally 
good individual (e.g., a list of specific virtues), which I will not address here. Instead, I 
will treat ‘proper’ action as indeterminate, referring to those actions that are characteristic 
of a morally good life, whatever that turns out to be. 
  In the following sections, I will further explain and justify these claims. First, I 
will present the two interpretations of action in basic outline. While the first interpretation 
of action serves to constrain what counts as an action generally, the second provides the 
foundation for prescriptive norms given a certain foundational choice. Then I will show 
how these claims answer Enoch’s objection and give us an interesting conception of con-
stitutivism. I will here be using the concept of living, in a rich way, that implies living 
well (or flourishing), but in a way that is indeterminate and open-ended. Rather than spec-
ify a definite description of a flourishing life, my view here places a broad constraint on 
what a normative ethical theory will look like: that we understand it by reference to our 
needs as organisms that need agency to live well. It also requires that we consider the ob-
jectivity of morality in a specific way, viz., that is paradigmatic of the objectivity of activ-
ities such as the useful arts, the natural sciences, or the learning of any skill. In each of 
these cases, we consider prescriptive norms associated with these activities to be objec-
tive because of facts of reality that require us to pursue them only in certain ways to do 
them well: it is possible to be mistaken in these practices due to their internal standards of 
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correctness. Moreover, we take it to be the case that these activities place norms upon us 
only if we have made relevant choices (e.g., to learn a skill or practice science). Consider 
a contrast with an activity such as picking an ice cream flavor: there are no standards of 
correctness that apply, and hence no objective prescriptive norms for proceeding. One 
simply chooses whichever flavor one happens to desire at the time. As I will explain fur-
ther in section V, the objectivity I am focusing on here is to be distinguished from cate-
goricity.  
 My methodology here is similar to that of a recent constitutivist approach outlined 
by Paul Katsafanas (2013). While I do not ultimately agree with the view that Katsafanas 
lays out, his theory is similar to my approach in an important respect, and therefore a 
brief observation may clarify my discussion. Katsafanas argues that action has two con-
stitutive aims, equilibrium and power, but that only the latter can generate substantive 
normative conclusions. He develops this view by noting that we have good philosophical 
and empirical reasons to understand full-fledged action as a kind of activity that is stable 
under reflection in the face of further information or consideration. 
 Katsafanas argues that we need some way to connect the “notion of agential activ-
ity…with some standard enabling us to assess our values and attitudes” for our theory to 
generate substantive results, and for him Nietzsche’s will to power serves that role. He 
rightly points out that if the only aim of action is something like equilibrium, or Velle-
man’s “self-knowledge,” we could only have a limited interest in the normative conclu-
sions (if any) of the constitutivist project.   
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 The way Katsafanas formulates his account around two aims of action is very 
similar to the approach I am using in the next two sections, except that my view of ac-
tion’s substantive aim (which I instead refer to as the substantive interpretation of action) 
is life. I agree with Katsafanas that we need not understand action in merely a minimal 
way, although this is in itself a perfectly legitimate perspective on action. To create a 
foundation for ethics, we must be able to understand action in a more substantive way as 
having a richer and more complex aim. 
 Before I continue, it is important to mark a set of important distinctions that I 
shall rely upon for the remainder of this essay. These are the following: 
1. Passive activity vs. full-fledged action 
2. Distinctively human action vs. non-agential processes 
3. Proper vs. defective action in the context of human life 
The first distinction between passive activity and full-fledged action is one that I 
shall make use of in outlining my minimal interpretation of action. I am interested here in 
a certain spectrum of cases that range from totally passive behavior to full-fledged action. 
The minimal interpretation, which I will discuss in section III, serves to mark this differ-
ence between passive behavior that is often not under our control or awareness and the 
complex intentional action that is involved in normativity, planning, etc. This distinction 
is compatible with the fact that within human agency there are degrees of complexity and 
reflectiveness that can accompany actions. For instance, my actions this morning in get-
ting out of bed and brushing my teeth may arguably not be as expressive of my agency as 
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my writing of this essay, but nevertheless the former actions are in some sense not entire-
ly passive. For the purposes of the minimal interpretation of action, I group these together 
insofar as they are intentional and therefore distinct from involuntary activity (such as 
knee-jerks). 
  The second distinction, which I rely on in section IV, serves to identify that dis-
tinctively human form of living that involves full-fledged action as I have described it. 
While human beings still need many forms of passive activity in order to live (such as our 
circulatory system or our lymphatic system), this is not the distinctive form that our lives 
take compared to other organisms. The third distinction, also important to section IV, is 
what is captured by my substantive interpretation of action as aiming at human life or 
flourishing. Full-fledged human actions in the minimal sense can be inimical to a suc-
cessful human existence (e.g., vicious and immoral actions), and these would count as 
defective actions in the substantive sense. 
 III. The Minimal Interpretation of Action 
 To even begin discussing what agency is (even in formal terms), we first need 
some broad outline of what counts as an agent in a minimal sense, and a distinction be-
tween action and mere activity. Since this is the broadest context in which ethical action 
occurs, laying out a minimal description of action will allow me to define a narrower 
range or subset of those actions that count as proper or good actions. According to stan-
dard views in the philosophy of action, we are engaged in action when we are in some 
way behaving in accordance with our reflectively endorsed intentions, desires, or goals.  
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  Minimally, action aims at realizing our stable intentions.  When we act, we create 9
a concrete or real version of what we intended or planned to do, both in our mental lives 
(such as by forming beliefs, opinions, etc) or in the physical world (with physical move-
ment). In basic terms, this captures the difference we want to identify between a mere ac-
tivity, such as my heart beating, or my reflexive knee-jerking, versus my current decision 
to write this paper and the practical expression of that decision. These passive activities 
do not reflect the same kind of complex teleology and purposive nature that full-fledged 
action expresses. These observations highlight the difference between agents who are 
akratic and those who act in accordance with goals that are stable under reflection and 
coherent with the agent’s larger scheme of values. Philosophers such as Michael Bratman 
(2000) and Harry Frankfurt (1988) have discussed at length what our pre-theoretical view 
of agency involving self-government or the realization of stable intentions amounts to. 
While I do not have space to discuss this view (and related or competing views of inten-
tional action) in detail, it is broadly agreed among different views in this literature that 
part of what it means to be an agent and engaged in full-fledged action is that we can re-
flect upon the attitudes driving our actions, and that we endorse them. To the extent that 
we do not endorse our attitudes, the activities that result from these cannot count as full-
fledged actions, since there is a gap between our self-governance and our behavior. It is 
this that I mean when I suggest that action aims at realizing our stable intentions. In this 
 This is quite similar to the view Kieran Setiya defends in “Explaining Action,” (2003) a paper I am quite 9
sympathetic with in several ways. However, unlike Setiya, I think that we do not need to stop at a minimal 
conception of action.
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minimal sense, we cannot yet set apart “good” from “bad” actions. Either an action is the 
realization of the intention of the agent, or it is not.   10
 On this level of explanation, a wide variety of individuals count as agents, and a 
wide variety of behavior will count as action. Individuals we typically regard as evil, or 
even sociopathic are agents in this sense; they have goals and intentions that are stable. In 
short, no negative evaluation is used in determining who counts as an agent or not. This 
does not entail that we cannot evaluate such individuals as being bad by some separate 
standard. It just means that such an evaluation is not based merely on this minimal defini-
tion. 
  Once we have delimited the scope of agency in the minimal sense, we can inves-
tigate whether agency can give rise to normative prescriptions. The question is whether 
any fact of reality requires the choice to use one’s agency (that is, act in accordance with 
a certain standard) only in certain ways. The answer will determine whether there are ob-
jective normative standards governing how agents ought to act, and what counts as a 
good or bad action, given a certain goal. This is similar to how we might proceed in justi-
fying normative standards in other activities. In a minimal sense, anyone who is engaged 
in a practice of prescribing treatments to injured or sick people is engaging in medicine. 
Once we have established that fact, we can see that the goal of preventing disease and 
death together with facts of biology gives rise to substantive norms, dictating what counts 
 How we understand “intention” here is of course also going to be relevant (as Anscombe’s 1957 work 10
suggests) and potentially controversial. This is not the place to resolve this issue however, since I take it 
that whatever account of intention we provide it is agreed in general that intention is key to something 
counting as an action. 
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as good or bad medicine. However, we can still maintain a minimal interpretation of the 
concept “medicine” for use in a broader context; for example, if we are discussing 
shamanistic rituals in pre-historic eras, witch-doctors, medieval practices of leeching, etc.  
 If the way we use our agency (i.e., the way we make decisions, direct our inten-
tions, develop dispositions to form intentions, etc.) has no implications for how we ought 
to live or values we should pursue, then Enoch will be right, and the features of agency 
will be arbitrary from a normative point of view.  
 However, here we must be careful. For on a view such as Enoch’s, how we act is 
of course normatively important, since there are facts about what constitutes good action 
or evil action, etc. Therefore, it is not sufficient as a defense of constitutivism merely to 
point out that how we act has normative implications. For constitutivism to be true, it 
must be the case that action itself gives rise to or constitutes the values that are the source 
and ultimate standard of normativity. In the next section, I shall develop and defend this 
view. My view will defend the following four claims: 
1. The biological process of life for human beings is constituted by action. 
2. The biological process of life is the source of all normative reasons for action, be-
cause it is life that necessitates and makes possible proper action.  
3. Action aims at living well (i.e., successfully meeting the requirements of life). 
4. Life provides normative reasons for action only if we have embraced the goal of liv-
ing. 
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   IV. Life as the Proper Constitutive Aim of Action 
1. The biological process of life for human beings is constituted by action. 
 To explain my first claim, we must define the concept of ‘life.’ In this context, life 
is a process; it is a constant self-produced activity and reaction to the external world. The 
common characteristics used to define ‘life’ and set living things apart from non-living 
things all involve certain kinds of processes: metabolism, growth, reproduction, response 
to stimuli, self-organization. A mere list of the physical and chemical components of liv-
ing organisms would not suffice to grasp the concept of life. Indeed, it is the fact that life 
is and requires constant motion and self-initiated processes in the face of the constant 
threat of death that makes a wide number of uniquely biological concepts possible.  11
These include the concepts of ‘health,’ ‘fitness,’ ‘nutrition,’ ‘harm,’ and so on. These con-
cepts, and the judgments applying them, are a kind of evaluation that can only occur 
against the backdrop of this threat and the fact that living necessitates engaging in specif-
ic processes or activities.  12
 Let us use ‘activity’ to refer to these kinds of self-initiated processes, which in liv-
ing organisms aim at their continued survival and flourishing, regulated by their tendency 
to perpetuate themselves. As Christine Korsgaard (2009) puts it in Self-Constitution, 
when (discussing Aristotle) she claims that: “a living thing is a thing so designed as to 
 By this I mean: processes that are not mere reactions to external stimuli without any aim or function. 11
Even plants, on a more basic level than humans and other animals, exhibit teleological causation in that 
they are organized in a way such that their processes “aim at” or are regulated by the contribution of those 
processes to the goal of survival. For a defense of this view of teleological causation, see Binswanger. 
 My discussion of the concept of ‘life’ here has been largely influenced by Thompson (2011).12
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maintain and produce itself: that is, to maintain and reproduce its own form. It has what 
we might call a self-maintaining form.” 
 Recall that (as Ferrero (2009) put it) for humans beings, agency (understood as 
our complex mode of deliberation and cognition) is crucial; it is the enterprise that sets 
the stage for the pursuit of all other, less fundamental enterprises. But for human beings, 
agential activity is something we engage in only insofar as we are living, and acting is 
necessary in order to continue living, so there is an intimate relation between agency and 
human life. The distinctive feature of human agents is that we survive and flourish 
through our particular mode of cognition, which is agential in nature.  Using our capaci13 -
ty for agency, we acquire and communicate conceptual knowledge and apply it to our 
chosen purposes. We use this capacity to discover knowledge about what furthers our 
lives, and how we interact with our environment in order to fulfill our needs. From one 
perspective, agency just is our power to reason: we reflect, deliberate, and form conscious 
intentions to practically apply our knowledge in the service of our values. Since our 
knowledge is not given to us automatically, we have no choice about whether to do this if 
we are to survive successfully. Agency plays an essential role in human existence, and the 
choice to exist as a human being entails abiding by the norms of agency.  
 My view acknowledges that human life from a biological perspective involves 
more than just action. However, action plays a distinctive and unique role in human life, 
especially in making possible the distinctively human values upon which we depend, 
 In the context of this essay, I will refer to surviving and flourishing (for human beings) interchangeably. I 13
explain this point in greater detail towards the end of the essay.
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such as complex social values (governments, economies, religions, etc). From a biologi-
cal perspective, human life is also made possible by sub-agential processes, such as the 
involuntary operations of our muscles, organ systems, and so on, as well as our more ba-
sic cognitive processes such as perception and sensation. This is the biological aspect of 
the view of minimal action that I have laid out in section III: in categorizing human be-
ings as agents, we are conceptually separating them from non-agential organisms such as 
microbes, plants, and the lower animals.  In drawing this conceptual separation, agency 14
plays a crucial and central explanatory role, and therefore can properly be said to be the 
distinctive constitutive element of human existence. 
 One way to think of this idea is to relate it to Korsgaard’s concept of a ‘practical 
identity,’ which I take to be a slightly different perspective on the same issue. Korsgaard 
(2009) notes that human beings “…are self-conscious in a particular way: we are con-
scious of the grounds on which we act, and therefore are in control of them…Our concep-
tions of our practical identity govern our choice of actions, for to value yourself in a cer-
tain role or under a certain description is at the same time to find it worthwhile to do cer-
tain acts for the sake of certain ends…” On Korsgaard’s approach, our lives are constitut-
ed by our agency in the sense that the self-perpetuating processes that constitute life take 
the form of practical identities for us. Korsgaard (1996) views this not as an aspect of our 
biology as such, but a “description(s) under which you find your life to be worth living.” 
 There may be plausible reason to suppose that some nonhuman animals can exhibit primitive forms of 14
agency, however I will not get into this empirical question here. At most, this might require a more subtle 
distinction between forms of agency (i.e., human vs. nonhuman), but it would still be the case that humans 
have a distinctive form of agency due to its complexity and volitional nature.
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 This is a different approach to constitutivism than mine, since on this view our 
existence is tied much more closely to complex psychological and social issues. I am 
making a similar claim in the sense that I am focusing on the particular agential structures 
that set us apart from other animals and define our existence, but not in terms of practical 
identities. On my view, our particular agential mode of activity, expressed in our ability to 
conceive of goals and pursue complex intentions, is what human life is essentially made 
of. The basic difference between my view and Korsgaard’s, then, is that her form of con-
stitutivism is tied to our existence as persons (more specifically, persons with practical 
identities), whereas my form of constitutivism is tied to our existence as human organ-
isms.  
 In developing the concept of ‘life’ in my argument, it is helpful to note that which 
specific self-initiated processes constitute these activities, and what specific needs they 
are aimed at fulfilling, is not universal across life forms. The metabolism of an amoeba is 
not aimed at the kind of life proper to a bee, whose gathering of honey is not aimed at the 
kind of life proper to an albatross, whose thousand-mile flights across oceans are not 
aimed at the kind of life proper to a human being. The particular conditions and needs of 
each organism play a role in setting the standard for what counts as its life-furthering ac-
tivity. Here we can benefit from an important insight from Phillippa Foot’s Natural 
Goodness.  
 Foot (2001) suggested that “features of plants or animals” can have a natural 
goodness or natural defect that is intrinsic to its specific species. This is what allows us to 
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make special evaluations of plants and animals, that do not need to refer to any instru-
mental consideration.  For example, a male peacock that does not use his tail to attract 15
mates, or a mother wolf that ignores its cubs, are each arguably a defective instance of 
their kind. These kinds of judgments are intimately related to the teleological structure of 
the characteristics of the organisms in question: “the way an individual should be [in the 
case of non-human organisms] is determined by what is needed for self-maintenance, and 
reproduction…” To flourish, animals must behave in certain ways and exhibit certain 
specific characteristics rather than others. Indeed, this is what gives rise to the possibility 
of such judgments as “that is a healthy tree” or “that flower is sick” or “the honey is nu-
tritious for the bees.” In each case there is an implicit reliance upon the particular func-
tion or life-form of the organism in question, and the specific activities it must pursue in 
order to successfully continue its life-process.  
2. The biological process of life is the source of all normative reasons for action, be-
cause it is life that necessitates and makes possible proper action. 
 The self-maintaining activity I described in my first claim is a distinctively biolog-
ical phenomenon; non-living things do not and cannot engage in activities. Rocks, rivers, 
mountains, corpses, desks, phones, and cars cannot engage in self-initiated processes in 
 So, for instance, I am not referring to cases where we might say that a dog is “good for me” because 15
owning it makes me happy.
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the relevant sense because there is nothing at which they can aim.  Their causal interac16 -
tions with the world are not self-regulated teleologically. They can have no goals or pur-
poses because nothing is at stake for them; they have nothing to lose or gain by any 
change in the world, whether it results in their destruction or continued existence. Living 
things, on the other hand, do have something at stake: their lives can end or be lost, and 
thereby be permanently extinguished from the universe. For plants and animals, self-ini-
tiated activities, such as a flower turning its petals towards sunlight, or a whale migrating 
towards nutrient-filled waters, aim not merely to avoid this destruction, but to achieve the 
opposite: life or flourishing.  From another perspective, this is just what it is for a flower 17
or a whale to live. 
 It is the alternative of life and death that makes these self-regulated processes both 
possible and necessary. Life makes these possible because non-living things cannot aim 
at any goals or have values. Life makes goals and values necessary because continual ef-
fort is required to meet the needs of the living organism. When we consider my earlier 
claim, that human life is constituted by agency, we can see that this supports the further 
view that life is the only possible foundation of our normative reasons for action (of 
 It might be thought that human artifacts can be properly said to have aims or functions in the relevant 16
sense. For example, a knife as the function of cutting, a lawn mower the function of cutting grass properly, 
or a ship transporting goods and people across bodies of water. However, note that in each case the identifi-
cation of a function requires a connection with the human goals intimately related to those artifacts, and 
function is not an intrinsic feature of those objects themselves. See Foot (1961).
 I use this word because I think it is useful to highlight the fact that action aims not merely at “not dying 17
in the next instant” but meeting biological needs to the greatest degree possible and an existence in accord 
with the nature of the being in question. 
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course, to fully defend and explain this view will require the vindication of my next two 
claims).  
 An important and useful contrast can be made here with complex human artifacts 
that can arguably have some form of self-regulated teleological behavior. Setting aside 
the issue of artificial intelligence (and the fact that such a phenomenon might require a 
new definition of ‘life’), artifacts such as computers, robots, and so on may have appar-
ently self-regulating mechanisms that are highly intricate and complex, yet clearly these 
artifacts do not themselves give rise to independent normative standards of the kind I am 
considering. 
 Primarily, this is because complex artifacts could not have a teleological structure 
that is unrelated to the human goals or intentions behind their creation. This means that 
any teleological structure exhibited in artifacts, even if it is in some limited sense self-
regulating such as in the case of an advanced computer, is derived from the living human 
beings who created it and their purpose in creating that object. This point can be put in 
terms of the form of explanation sought for the activity that such complex artifacts may 
exhibit. Suppose we were to discover an alien robot that exhibit apparently complex self-
regulating mechanisms, setting itself computational tasks and printing out results in a 
language we could not understand. How could we explain the success or failure of this 
artifact relative to its purposes? The answer is that without knowledge of the intentions of 
the designers of the artifact, no satisfactory explanation could be given. Suppose further 
that the robot self-destructed. Could we say that the robot was defective? Not unless we 
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can know that the intentions of the designers of the robot were not to cause it to self-de-
struct. In the case of living organisms, no such external explanation is needed to evaluate 
the success or failure of the organism or understand the source of its normative standards; 
the life-form and biological structure of the organism is sufficient. 
 At this point, another question may arise. Why could we not accept that we must 
be alive in order to have normative reasons for action, but still maintain that we have rea-
sons for action that do not pertain to our form of life? The answer is that any such reason 
would necessarily have to rely on some standard external to life. Consider, for example, a 
system of normative reasons for action that resulted in the view that what we have most 
reason to do is whatever would maximize the total amount of ice cream in the world.  18
This system could not generate genuine normative reasons because it would fail to take 
into account the context in which action (and hence reasons for action) arises. Since what 
makes action possible and necessary is the fact that we engage in it as a means of living 
distinctively human lives, there is no reason to maximize the total amount of ice cream in 
the world (except of course in a bizarre circumstance where doing so would most pro-
mote human flourishing).  
 One worry at this point might be that the view that all of our normative reasons 
for action must somehow relate to what promotes our mode of living, or in other words 
that life is the ultimate standard by which we derive our normative reasons for action, 
will fail to take into account all of our pre-theoretical ethical concerns. While further dis-
 Clearly, this is an absurd view, but I think it helps illustrate why the standard of normative reasons I have 18
described has objective force and is not merely an arbitrary selection.
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cussion later in this essay shall address related concerns and hopefully remove them, I 
will comment here on why this would be a mistaken view. First, I have not (and will not) 
in this essay explicitly described the details of what I think a good life would include. I 
have relied instead upon a formal notion of flourishing, since it is the business of norma-
tive ethics and psychology to determine more fully what this involves, and is therefore 
beyond the scope of this essay. Second, we can see that my account does not so far rule 
out a rich conception of what is included in a good life, especially if we take seriously 
that human beings are social  and political organisms and that many of our institutions are 
relevant to the kind of life that we need to live. Moreover, my account can easily accom-
modate the view that human beings must live according to certain principles or develop 
their character in certain ways in order to fulfill the demands of agency (though again, I 
have deliberately left this rather open-ended for the purposes of this essay). 
3. Action aims at living well (i.e., successfully meeting the requirements of life). 
 My second claim ties my first observation to my earlier discussion of constitu-
tivism. We can see how the view I laid out with my first claim leads naturally to the idea 
that action aims at living well.   19
 Generally, an organism’s self-initiated behavior is an important part of the founda-
tion for evaluating organisms (including humans) as instances of their kind. Since human 
life is constituted by agential activity, the foundation for evaluating human beings as in-
stances of their kind will stem from the nature of action and its constitutive aim.  
 For an anticipation of a possible objection to my switch from discussing ‘life’ to ‘living well,’ or ‘flour19 -
ishing,’ see section VII.
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 Let me quickly set aside a possible confusion. In the human case, this view does 
not entail that there is only “one kind of life” (perhaps in a way similar to certain inter-
pretations of Aristotle) that is fit for human beings to live.  The role agency plays in our 20
lives is more complex than that, for it pertains to one’s basic choices in light of the goal 
of living. This fact is compatible with a wide number of interests, preferences, and ca-
reers, (or indeed, “practical identities”) and it is compatible with a guide to evaluating 
and prescribing norms for action. Nor does it entail that humans must engage in repro-
duction to live well (which is arguably the case for other creatures) or that physical prow-
ess or strength is necessarily important for human flourishing; the range and character of 
our needs and our characteristic mode of living is very different from that of other organ-
isms.  21
 However, to reiterate, as humans we are organisms with the distinctive feature of 
intentional agency (here understood as the minimal interpretation): we can deliberate, 
form plans and intentions, organize our knowledge into concepts, predict the future, cul-
tivate certain character traits or habits, weigh the consequences of our actions, etc. These 
features of agency are ones that we must employ, and employ only in certain ways, if we 
are to live as human beings and fulfill our individual physical and especially our psycho-
 Of course, it does put constraints on what kinds of lives might be proper to human beings. A life of 20
thievery, or of hedonism, may not be in accordance with the requirements of agency.
 I also wish to mention that there may be borderline cases of human beings who are unable to engage in 21
practical reason because of a mental health condition or external circumstance such as extreme brainwash-
ing or corruption. It may be that the standards I discuss here could not properly apply to such individuals, 
even if they are indeed human beings; this would not itself necessarily be problematic for my view since 
this can be dealt with by a theory of defective cases. This is not a problem specific to my form of constitu-
tivism, since all forms of constitutivism must in some way or another respond to the charge that defective 
agents are possible.
 
!27
logical needs successfully.  Living well requires acting well, and so on the substantive 22
interpretation we are full agents to the extent that we strive to meet these needs.  This is 23
why it makes sense to say that action aims at living well, rather than just life as such (in-
terpreted in some minimal way). Contrast this picture with the function that our heart has 
in allowing us to live. Our heart must meet certain standards in order for us to live; it 
must not be too weak, it must beat regularly, and so on. However, it would be false to say 
that our heart aimed at our living well; because we have many complex needs and desires 
that hearts cannot fulfill. On the other hand, our complex psychological and social needs 
that we need to fulfill to achieve a (pre-theoretically) fulfilling and flourishing existence 
requires the successful use of our agency. 
 Given that action aims at living well, we are now in position to see (at least, in 
outline) how normative standards for evaluating human beings might be structured. A 
human being is evaluated as doing well insofar as she is a good agent according to the 
requirements of living a successful human life. But is this the right kind of evaluation? 
After all, as I mentioned earlier, the goal of constituvism was ideally to secure the foun-
 I wish to remind the reader here that on this view, the specific needs we have, and how those translate 22
into specific normative prescriptions, are normative and not metaethical issues, and therefore these ques-
tions are not answered directly here. 
 It might be thought here that this view leads to a form of consequentialist ethical egoism, where the pre23 -
scriptions of morality guide us to do whatever maximizes our chances or successes at survival. But this 
would be a misinterpretation of my position. The consequences of particular actions on our survival do not 
serve as the standard or criterion for good practical reasoning; rather, it is the other way around. What 
counts as “living” for human beings is determined by our characteristic mode of functioning, which is our 
agency. This is why we can make sense of the fact that courageously throwing oneself before a loved one to 
save them from a bullet is morally admirable despite the fact that it results in the death of the agent. On my 
view, acting with courage in this case is an instance of good practical reasoning because human beings need 
courage to flourish. 
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dation of ethical norms. What I have laid out so far seems only to secure the foundation 
of biological norms. Moreover, what I have argued so far only shows how we might un-
dertake the evaluation of human beings according to certain biological norms, not any 
prescriptive norms. Just as the constitutive standards applying to functional artifacts like 
knives do not provide reasons for action apart from human choices or goals, neither do 
the constitutive standards applying to action. Therefore, I have not fully answered 
Enoch’s two questions: 1. Why should we care about being good agents?  and 2. Can we 
ground objective normativity in agency? 
 However, the direction in which my argument will continue might be foreseeable. 
For one thing, although I have laid out the foundation of biological norms, on my view 
our particular form of life is constituted by agential activity, which means that these are 
norms that govern the kinds of choices we make, the goals we set for ourselves, and how 
we conceive of ourselves (or our practical identities). It is clear that norms governing 
these issues are quite intimately relate to ethical norms. My answer to how prescriptive 
norms will be justified has also been suggested by my earlier remarks. For recall my ob-
servation in section I that for other constitutive-style norms such as in the sciences or use-
ful arts, we take it that prescriptive norms acquire their application insofar as we have 
made the relevant choice or adopted a certain goal.  
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4. Life provides normative reasons for action only if we have embraced the goal of 
living.  
 For animals and plants, their biological success depends largely on pre-pro-
grammed patterns of behavior and they have no choice whether or not to maintain their 
existence. But for human beings, existence is a choice. There is no external cause that 
necessitates our desire to flourish and our commitment to the proper use of agency.  The 24
capacity of agency that allows us to form complex intentions, plan abstract goals, and en-
gage in deliberation, is volitional in nature.  Because agency is volitional, we cannot 25
evaluate human beings in exactly the same way we evaluate plants and animals (i.e., as if 
their behavior were fully determined by their species). 
 How do we experience the volitional nature of agency? Basically, we experience 
this in the form of the reflective nature of agency. As Michael Bratman (2000) has put it, 
“…our reflectiveness, [and] our planfulness…are among the core features of human 
agency.” A crucial aspect of living a human life (and living successfully, in ethical and 
biological terms) involves our ability to take a stand or reflect upon our values, and even 
our entire set of values. While it is true that, as Ferrero (2009) explained, we cannot re-
flect upon agency itself without being within its domain, this does not mean that we au-
tomatically act in accordance with the requirements of agency. 
 If we necessarily pursued the constitutive aim of action regardless of our choices, there could be no room 24
for normative prescriptions.
 I do not mean here to commit myself to any particular view of free will or compatibilism, but to suggest 25
that there is some sense in which the way we react to external and internal pressures for survival is based in 
part on decisions we make.
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 More important to the purpose at hand is my view that the volitional nature of our 
agency means that we can choose to reject life. We can reject this capacity, and our 
agency, and thereby give up the value of our lives. From this perspective, the constitutive 
aim of action as life applies to those who share the basic commitment to live. Once an 
agent embraces the goal of living well, and in a broad sense orients her intentions to pur-
sue her life (in the way discussed above), this gives her normative reasons for action. This 
moreover means that what constitutes an action for such an agent (on the substantive in-
terpretation) is that it aims at promoting her life, since that is her basic aim or intention.  
 We are now in a position to relate this view back to my two interpretations of ac-
tion. We needed a minimal interpretation of action in order to understand the phe-
nomenon of action as such: the fact that human beings have a distinctive mode of cogni-
tion that involves our ability to form intentions, goals, plans, etc. Given this context, I 
argued at the beginning of this section that our capacity for this kind of action is intimate-
ly related to our particular form of life. Indeed, our lives are constituted by action, and 
action aims at our living. Moreover, action is the only means by which we can live suc-
cessfully. With these observations in hand, we can claim that on a substantive interpreta-
tion genuine or proper actions are those that promote our lives, while actions that go 
against the requirements of human life count as defective or lesser actions. This substan-
tive interpretation is necessary to establish ethical norms as deriving from the constitutive 
aim of action, since it provides the content necessary to evaluate actions as being good or 
bad. However, it also means, given the volitional nature of agency, that adopting the aim 
 
!31
of life is a precondition for the normative prescriptions that guide us in acting well and 
living well. 
 The dependency of normative standards on a certain use of our volition is not 
unique to the norms governing agency. Consider another example, farming. Farming has 
constitutive standards, and even though the activity of farming is objectively defensible 
given the constitutive aim of action (because it is a life-promoting activity), we have no 
reasons or commitment to engage in farming or to subject ourselves to the standards of 
farming unless we adopt the goal of farming. Once we do, this entails abiding by certain 
objective standards specific to that activity, and (recall my discussion of objectivity in 
section II) means that we can be mistaken or fail with respect to those standards. 
V. Choice and Objectivity 
 This example brings out an important point about the nature of objectivity. The 
objectivity of norms (including moral norms), on my view, does not imply categoricity. 
According to some (especially Kantian and neo-Kantian) approaches to moral philoso-
phy, if moral prescriptions are to be objective, they must apply independently of particu-
lar features of our psychology such as our desires or goals. Since my view rests the ap-
plicability of moral norms upon a basic choice, it would fail this test of objectivity. How-
ever, it is my view that we need not understand objectivity in this way. Instead, we can 
think of the norms deriving from agency depending on a relevant goal, just as the norms 
deriving from farming depend on one’s having certain goals. This does not make these 
norms any less important to our lives and our evaluations of others, and it does not make 
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these norms arbitrary. Importantly, my view still captures the notion of objectivity that is 
a hallmark of moral realism: “the relevant facts about humans and their world are objec-
tive in the same sense that such non-relational entities as stones are: they do not depend 
for their existence or nature merely upon our conception of them” (Railton 1986). Finally, 
this approach to the objectivity of moral norms, to reiterate a theme that has been present 
throughout this essay, makes it no more mysterious or unaccountable than the objectivity 
of other, derivative norms such as those governing sciences and the acquisition of skills. 
My view places a tight connection between our values and choices and the norms of 
morality, and therefore there is less room for the worry that the norms of morality are ar-
bitrary from a rational agent’s perspective or that we need additional explanations for 
why one ought to care about being moral. This is significant in light of Enoch’s criticisms 
to the effect that constitutive norms would be normatively arbitrary. 
 Additionally, no part of this view contradicts the fact that agency is special in Fer-
rero’s sense, explained in section II. Agency only prescribes certain standards once we 
have adopted the goal of living, but it is only within the context of living that we can de-
liberate or reflect upon our reasons for action at all. Furthermore, since to live well as a 
human being is at least partly constituted by being a good agent, the goal of living is ar-
guably not some separate or more fundamental aim than that of being a good agent; it is 
that same goal from a different perspective. Since agency is the means by which humans 
live, not choosing to regulate one’s actions by the aim of agency, or evading the need to 
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use our capacity to reason properly, precludes the possibility of achieving (genuine) val-
ues or acting on reasons.  
 What do we make of individuals who fundamentally are not pursuing their own 
lives, and in fact acting in such ways that destroy themselves and their values (and often 
those of others)? Perhaps fanatical terrorists or murderers will be extreme examples of 
such individuals.  However, these extreme examples need not exhaust the cases in which 26
one chooses not to live. At any moment and with respect to any specific issue of human 
life, the volitional nature of our cognition entails that we can consciously abandon agency 
or fail to strive for its goal: living is a process that requires continual effort. If one does 
not choose to live, one’s activities will tend towards the destruction of one’s very capacity 
as an agent. On this account, individuals that do not pursue life could still be an agent in 
the minimal sense of having intentions (although even this might only be temporary), but 
insofar as such an individual does not aim at life at all, this individual would count as a 
defective agent.  In fact, this seems to be precisely what bothers us about such individu27 -
als (that is, thoroughly evil individuals, or individuals who have no regard for their lives 
and the lives of others); they do not share our goals and our prescriptive norms, and so in 
 I am sympathetic to the discussion by Kennett and Matthews (2008) on the relation between psychopa26 -
thy and the norms of agency. In this paper, they argue that there is empirical evidence to support the view 
that those untouched by moral norms are also defective more broadly in terms of exercising practical ratio-
nality.
 There is an interesting question here about how we classify such individuals versus those who are fun27 -
damentally pursuing life. On my view, just as we cannot evaluate single decisions or events in a human life 
out of context, so we cannot evaluate single actions apart from the kind of life an agent is leading and the 
character traits exhibited by that agent. This is a further sense in which my view lends itself to a neo-Aris-
totelian approach to ethics.
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a fundamental sense we cannot reach them.  While we can evaluate such individuals in 28
this way, our prescriptions or moral arguments could have no force on such individuals 
until they take up the aim of life.  
 This may strike some as counter-intuitive, since it is often thought that the imper-
atives of morality could not be “hypothetical,” and yet I seem to have defended precisely 
such a view.  But moral norms are not hypothetical in the usual sense. Since the choice 29
to live is a basic choice upon which the possibility of values and reasons for action rest, 
my account can withstand such an objection. Classifying my account as a “hypothetical” 
view of morality would also be misleading for the reason that the choice to live is unlike 
any other choice. In a very real sense, the choice to live, while still being a choice insofar 
as it is volitional, is not hypothetical, and does not present one with options. Typically, 
when we make a choice, we are doing so in the context of a choice between possible (real 
or apparent) values. However, the choice to live is a choice between values and the lack 
of values. But even this is not entirely accurate, since the lack of all values in this context 
for a human being ultimately means non-existence. From this perspective, then, my view 
is simply a different perspective on the fact that humans can choose to abandon their goal 
 This might be similar, in a less negative way, to the way we treat children. Before they reach a certain 28
age, in some sense we do not regard children as fully responsive to prescriptive norms. However, we still 
act as though they are beholden to promises and other obligations, for example, so as to condition them 
with habits and dispositions in the hope that they will eventually choose to pursue a good life.
 Kantian approaches to ethics are paradigmatic cases of this view. See Foot (1972) for a critical examina29 -
tion of this view. There is a sense in which my view grounds morality universally in that it is not relativis-
tic; while prescriptive norms do not apply to all agents, there is only one set of basic prescriptive norms that 
could apply to agents. These norms do not depend on arbitrary features of those agents but rather what it 
means to live a human life as such. 
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of living and choose to reject the norms that we need to live successfully. This is a pre-
theoretically uncontroversial claim.  
 At this point it may be insisted that my view, because of its departure at certain 
key points in the arguments, could not be properly considered constitutivist. For instance, 
it might be insisted that constitutivism is fundamentally a project that aims at grounding 
prescriptive morality categorically and universally to all agents regardless of their choices 
or goals. Certainly it is true that the projects of philosophers such as David Velleman and 
Christine Korsgaard have this element. If we wish to cast the debate in this way, I am per-
fectly happy conceding the term “constitutivism” to that project and calling my view 
something else. This does not itself undermine the theoretical advantages of my position, 
however. Apart from directly responding to Enoch, this view neatly avoids the tension 
that a view like Velleman’s arguably faces. This is the problem that constitutivism must 
either rely on an implausibly rich account of what it means to be an agent to derive moral 
norms, or else maintain a plausible account of agency but concede the project of ground-
ing moral norms in that capacity. Finally, I wish to stress that my account here includes a 
feature unique to the constitutivist project, in that it seeks to ground all norms in the spe-
cial nature of agency. 
VI. Caring About Morality 
 Enoch’s challenge raised two basic questions: “can morality be grounded in non-
normative considerations of agency?” and “why ought one be an agent?” Enoch argued 
that the constitutivist has not shown that we have a reason to act in accordance with its 
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constitutive aims, since we may have no reason to engage in that enterprise to begin 
with.  30
 Enoch’s “shmagent,” who asks why should I care about the constitutive aim of 
action, could now be understood (in the context of my argument) to be asking why one 
should care about living well or flourishing as a human being. Or, to view the issue in 
light of the two-interpretation view, the shmagent is an agent in the broad or minimal 
sense asking whether he should adopt the proper aim of action. How can we answer the 
“shmagent”? 
 A brief point from Philippa Foot (2001) is helpful here. When asking whether to 
act in accordance with the demands of practical reason, she notes that if we understand 
the question as being one about why these specific things (e.g. being honest, productive, 
just etc.) are what we should care about, it is a matter of first-order or normative ethics to 
explain how those things contribute to our lives, i.e. (on my view) are in accordance with 
the constitutive aim of action. On the other hand, if we understand the question as being 
about why we ought to live well, whatever that turns out to be (in a formal sense), then 
this is “…to ask for a reason where reasons must a priori have come to an end.” In short, 
there is nothing in terms of reasons that could commit an individual who is only an agent 
in the minimal sense to adopt the substantive aim of action. It is the basic choice to live 
that bridges the gap between these two senses of action. One who does not aim at living 
 Enoch also cautions against making the “adversarial stance” mistake. This is the mistake Enoch (218) 30
describes of pointing out that a skeptic of some kind is self-defeating, and concluding that the skeptic’s 
arguments are thereby refuted. It is compatible with a skeptical position being self-defeating that it also 
points to problems in our own views. 
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has no need for morality, since the phenomenon of life is what grounds all needs. There-
fore, this question could not arise for such an individual. 
  To reiterate, this does not mean that what follows from the choice to live is nor-
matively arbitrary; it simply means that morality is meaningless and useless apart from 
that goal — one needs no guidance in order not to live, and a fortiori no reasons for ac-
tion. Individuals who abandon the substantive aim of agency may attempt to realize their 
intentions in some sense, but they will be unable to flourish as human beings.  
     VII. Life and Living Well 
 In closing this essay I want to anticipate a further response from Enoch. It might 
be thought that in the course of arguing for life as the constitutive aim of action, and the 
norms that are created by this aim, I have equivocated between aiming at “living” and 
aiming at “living well” or flourishing. Surely the shmagent could respond with the fol-
lowing remark: “I did not intend to ask why should I care about living at all, but rather 
why should I care about living well or flourishing?”  After all, it is clearly possible for 31
any organism, including human beings, to be living more or less well, and we can imag-
ine human beings that only do that which is necessary to meet the basic threshold of 
physical survival. Throughout this essay I have been using ‘living’ and ‘flourishing’ in-
terchangeably. However, does it not seem possible that a shmagent is aiming at life but 
not at a full commitment to the norms of agency? The shmagent might accept that in or-
 This would be analogous, in this context, to asking why one should play the agency game well rather 31
than just meet the basic standards of agency in order to continue existing.
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der to be a shmagent, she must be alive, and therefore must meet that basic threshold. But 
why must the shmagent pursue life consistently? 
 Formulated in this fashion, however, this question would rest upon a confusion. 
This is for two reasons. First, it is not the case on my view that caring about living, or 
choosing to live, is some separate decision that one can make independently of one’s cur-
rent and possible values. Secondly, flourishing and living are two aspects of the same is-
sue. I will address these points in turn. 
1. Life as Constituted by Values 
 Life, understood here to mean “life as a human being” is the proper aim at which 
our actions must conform if we are to remain in existence and flourish.  But living for 32
human beings is not some separate result or consequence that acting well achieves; using 
our agency properly constitutes life as a human being, and living as a human being is a 
fuller specification of what life is for us. To illustrate this more vividly, consider Aristo-
tle’s remarks in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle observes that all our actions 
have some aim, and that this could not be possible unless there were some ultimate end or 
aim towards which all actions were a means. He ultimately concludes that this ultimate 
end is happiness (eudaimonia). Shortly after making this claim, however, Aristotle notes 
that this is a rather uninteresting way to describe our ultimate end, since everyone dis-
agrees about what happiness consists in or is constituted by, and therefore such a formal 
description cannot actually guide our action. One could interpret Aristotle as holding the 
 Keep in mind that here I use the concept of flourishing formally, viz. as that which constitutes living well 32
or successfully.
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view that happiness is an end we all agree on (both formally and substantively) but that 
we disagree about the means required to achieve happiness. However, this would be mis-
taken (although to be sure, this type of disagreement is also possible). The important dis-
agreement in Aristotle’s context is that people disagree on what happiness consists in, 
since some hold it to be a life of pleasure, others a life centered on wealth, etc. In the con-
text of my discussion, I am putting forward the view that life is the proper ultimate end 
and that it consists in acting well and pursuing values proper to a human being. As I dis-
cuss in section IV of this essay, it is important for my view that we can understand life as 
being a process or consisting of a certain kind of activity, rather than being conceived of 
as a static state. 
 Let us return, then, to the shmagent. What would it mean for the shmagent to pur-
sue life up to some basic threshold but not be committed fully? It would mean, on my 
view, that the shmagent is compromising genuine values; the reason not to act in this way 
is that it means acting against the reasons and values that one has. Since life is constituted 
by proper action and the pursuit of proper values, one cannot compromise on one’s com-
mitment to life without compromising one’s values. Moreover, viewed from the opposite 
perspective, there is nothing to be gained by reducing one’s commitment to life, since it is 
the source and basis of all values.  
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2. How we choose to live 
  While it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully explicate how choice functions 
in our moral psychology, since choice plays an important role in the account I have out-
lined, it is worth making several observations on that point. It is also important not to in-
terpret “choosing to live” exclusively as a single explicit decision that each individual 
must make, once and for all; while people are of course occasionally faced with such life 
or death decisions, this is not the norm. It is tempting to think of “choice” as referring 
solely to specific, concrete decisions such as a decision between “vanilla or chocolate?”, 
“Hawaii or Florida?” and so on. However, can (and often do) think of choices on wider 
timescales.  
 Consider a choice by a fictional character, John, to pursue a graduate degree in 
philosophy. When did that choice occur? Is it possible for him to make that choice once 
and for all, and then do whatever he wants, with no normative consequences for that de-
cision or his values? Of course not. Even if it is true that there was one specific moment 
of conclusive decision-making, choosing to pursue a graduate degree in philosophy in-
volves more than just saying one is going to do it. John’s decision involves various kinds 
of preparation, study, ability, and dedication. At the same time, we can observe quite ac-
curately that specific moments of decision making reflect or partially constitute his 
choice. When John works to finish a term paper on time, or prepares his discussion sec-
tions, he is choosing to pursue a graduate degree in philosophy, since this is the goal that 
is constituted by these kinds of activities. Similarly, at any given time John can fail to 
 
!41
make this choice; he can fail to take the effort necessary to pursue the values that consti-
tute getting this degree, and choose non-values or lesser values such as destructive habits 
or spending time around negative individuals. To the extent that John does this, he will 
fail to act well as a graduate student. In doing so, he may not immediately ruin his ability 
to get a degree, but over time he may diminish his prospects at succeeding in his field. In 
these respects, pursuing life is analogous, except that it is a much more all-encompassing 
perspective on all of one’s projects and values. This choice is best understood over a long 
range, encompassing a wide variety of projects, habits, character traits, and so on. Just as 
a day of sloppy work will not immediately bring John’s career crashing down (although 
in the right circumstances, it could), a day of immoral or irrational activity will not im-
mediately kill a person or erase one’s previous values (although in the right circum-
stances, it could).  
 What, then, is the nature of the harm that immoral or vicious action incurs upon 
an agent’s life? Of course, we can easily point out that in contemporary society many 
immoral actions such involving harming others are punishable by law and therefore carry 
serious consequences, but this is not the form of explanation that my argument could rely 
upon, since the fact that these actions have these consequences is a result of human 
choice, not nature itself. However, I think if we understand our psychological needs, in-
cluding the needs for self-respect and self-esteem, as playing an important role in an ex-
planation of this kind. This strikes me as promising because I think any account of what a 
good human life consists in must take our psychological well-being very seriously. Paul 
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Bloomfield (2014), for example, has recently defended a view on which acting morally is 
always in the best interest of our well-being because it is a necessary precondition for ac-
quiring self-respect, and that this is an objective need shared by all human beings. This 
way of treating the issue is especially illuminating for my purposes here since we do not 
take harm to self-respect to consist in all-or-nothing discrete events in people’s lives. I 
may lie to a friend now, or misrepresent myself on my job application, and these actions 
will not immediately or obviously harm my self-respect in a serious way, but they do in 
the wider context undermine it. On this view, it is the principle of acting in accordance 
with the demands of morality that is itself in our self-interest; from this perspective, it 
makes no sense to check whether in any given concrete case our self-interest is furthered 
or harmed by acting morally. That is a limited view of the nature of self-interest, which 
ignores the long-range context of living an overall good life.  
 We choose to live or act well whenever we pursue a productive career, raise a 
family, help a friend in need, prepare a meal, contemplate art, study for an exam, etc., (on 
the assumption that these are indeed life-promoting values). Our lives just are this 
process of life-promoting activities and goals; there is no separate “life” that we could 
choose or gain apart from these activities. It is not necessary, then, for individual agents 
to understand the explicit philosophical connections between what they are doing to be 
able to choose life or care about agency (though of course this may lead to their choices 
being inconsistent). The question about why one should care about living well is really 
about why one should care about those things and activities in one’s life (one’s career, 
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one’s romantic relationships, one’s good character) that make one’s life worth living. So 
from that perspective there is no separate choice from what furthers one’s life or fulfills 
rational needs and what enables one to survive; these are not in conflict. 
 I can hardly stress enough that life occurs on a continuum. We can choose things 
that further our life to a lesser extent, e.g., a career that does not enable us to develop as 
great skills as we could, or a partner that abuses us, or drug habits that destroy our long-
term health. Superficially, it seems to make sense to say that we could choose this kind of 
life, a life in which we value our agency only up to some basic threshold. And indeed, 
one might physically exist for a long time in such a state, and we can see that the vital 
processes of evil people or bad agents are not immediately arrested upon their perfor-
mance of immoral and irrational actions.  
 My view can explain this, however. The process of living is constant and demands 
continued attendance to its requirements. The long-range nature of our goals and needs 
(especially psychological or spiritual needs) means that we can act for our own destruc-
tion, or against the constitutive aim of action, and we do not immediately fall over and 
die.  The effects of (arguably) life-hindering actions such as dishonesty, laziness, or in33 -
temperance also have long-term effects on our psychological health that are not immedi-
ately perceivable, but this does not make them any less real. Choosing to live just is 
 Moreover, there is the fact that our biological activities on a sub-agential level are aimed at our life as 33
well, apart from our conscious decisions; and hence provided that we continue to receive a minimum of 
nutrition, oxygen, and rest our bodies will continue to engage in vital processes. This no more disproves my 
account than does the fact that a tree could be sick and sitting in poor soil means that trees do not need to be 
free from disease or have nutrient-rich soil in order to live. One cannot even have the concept of living for a 
particular organism or life-form, including human beings, apart from certain needs and a certain conception 
of flourishing that serves as that standard.
 
!44
choosing to flourish, but the latter merely makes more explicit that living is a matter of 
degree and that different kinds of lives are proper to different kinds of organisms. A hu-
man being cannot flourish by attempting to live as a plant, or vice versa. To suggest that a 
complete human life consists merely of a beating heart and lungs filled with air is to drop 
the context of what a human being is and how we characteristically behave and must be-
have given our faculty of agency. Living as a human being successfully means living in 
accordance with practical reason, whether the “shmagent” likes it or not. 
 VII. Action and Character 
 What I have argued here may not fully settle the question of how we morally 
evaluate individual agents on particular occasions, however. We may still wonder, for ex-
ample, whether the moral status of an individual who commits one vicious act after a life-
time of virtue compared to that same act committed by one who has lived an utterly im-
moral and depraved lifestyle. If on my view agency is the ultimate ground of normative 
prescription and evaluation, on what grounds could we find a moral difference between 
these two individuals?  
 While I cannot answer this question fully here, I hope to make some remarks that 
may illuminate the issue. This problem essentially stems from the fact that we apparently 
have two (and perhaps more) very different forms of moral evaluation: on the one hand, 
we can evaluate particular actions as actions abstracted away from the individual who 
committed the action (e.g. that individual’s character, history, context, and so on) and on 
the other hand we can view the action within the context of an individual’s character (and 
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so on) included. Notice that this is only a problem if we assume that both forms of moral 
evaluation are entirely separate and equally justified. However, on my view it is impossi-
ble to fully extricate the historical and deliberative context from the nature of any indi-
vidual action, and therefore no action could be fully evaluated apart from this context.  34
Often, we can justifiably assume a certain context (e.g. we are not in a war zone, or some 
other extreme crisis) and say that, e.g., killing innocent individuals as such is morally 
wrong, because of the kind of action it is. However, we could not evaluate a particular 
instance of this action accurately without the deliberative and circumstantial context of 
the agent in question. On my view, there is no such action as “killing an innocent individ-
ual” apart from a time, place, historical circumstance, and context of deliberation.   35
 What this means for my view is that issues of character, in particular, cannot be 
treated separately from issues of action (and vice versa) for the purposes of moral evalua-
tion. Our actions, insofar as we can be said to responsible for them, stem from the charac-
ter we have developed and formed over time, and indeed might be said to be a reflection 
of our character. This is entirely compatible with the view that action is the foundation of 
normativity since our moral character is shaped and determined primarily by our actions. 
In unfortunate or extreme circumstances, our ability to retain or create a stable moral 
character may be obstructed or destroyed by circumstances beyond our control. Imagine, 
 This does not imply, absurdly, that we must know the entire historical context (e.g., the lifespan of the 34
individual) in order to make a justified moral assessment of an individual’s action. However, it does place 
important constraints on moral evaluation.
 We might think that actions often occur without deliberation at all. Insofar as these may still be fully 35
fledged actions (since there are vague cases, I will not go into the matter here), this does not mean there is 
no context of deliberation. What I mean here can be understood as “whether and in what manner practical 
deliberation takes place with regard to the particular action in question.”
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for instance, the life of a child soldier in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, condi-
tioned to kill innocent people. In such a case, the child’s actions may not be said to be 
fully voluntary, and indeed may not count as full-fledged actions at all, precisely because 
of the full context in which that activity is occurring (i.e., an impoverished childhood, 
lack of education, emotional instability, psychological problems, etc.). 
     VIII. Conclusion 
 David Enoch has raised a challenge for constitutivist views in the philosophy of 
action that seek to derive objective norms from the nature of agency. In particular, they 
cannot answer the question of why we ought to be moral, and why the norms deriving 
from agency are not normatively arbitrary. I have argued that there is room for a constitu-
tivist view that can address these two questions and retain the theoretical advantages of 
constitutivism.  
 In sketching out this view, inspired by the work of Phillipa Foot and other neo-
Aristotelians, I showed how we can adopt a dual view of agency, in which we can inter-
pret agency in a minimal or substantive sense. Minimally, we are agents just in virtue of 
pursuing and realizing our intentions. On a substantive interpretation, given the biological 
role agency plays for human beings, we are agents by choosing to live in accordance with 
the requirements of agency. We reach this substantive interpretation by observing that life 
makes action for human beings possible and necessary, and is the only possible objective 
foundation of normativity. The norms deriving from agency are not arbitrary for agents 
that have chosen to live, since those norms guide us in achieving this goal: human beings 
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survive by using their agency. Given the volitional nature of agency, we can say that we 
ought to be moral if we choose to live. If we do not choose to live, this question cannot 
arise. Finally, this account avoids the structural dilemma that other constitutivists (partic-
ularly Velleman) might face between “packing in” too much or too little normativity, in 
that it does not presuppose a rich set of normative prescriptions for agents unless they 
have adopted the goal of living well. This does not mean, however, that morality is “op-
tional” or that we cannot morally evaluate the behavior of individuals who have rejected 
the aim of living well, to the extent that such individuals exist.  
 I have accomplished the aims of this essay only insofar as my assumptions about 
the nature of moral objectivity and the relationship between morality and choosing to live 
can be vindicated. In this respect, there is more work to be done in defending and expand-
ing upon my suggested approach to constitutivism. In particular, this view relies on spe-
cific approaches to the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of psychology that re-
quire further exploration and explication in order to vindicate its mode of constitutivism. 
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